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FOREWORD
ISLAM SYMPOSIUM: AN INTRODUCTION
ROBERT A. KAHN*
I. ISLAM, CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES, AND THE CURRENT
POLITICAL CLIMATE
In early 2009, the University of St. Thomas Law Journal decided to
hold a symposium on “Islamic Law and Constitutional Liberty.” One moti-
vation for the symposium was the hostile reception given to the Archbishop
of Canterbury’s speech calling for the British legal system to take a more
positive attitude toward Islamic Law.1 Another motivation arose in Ontario,
where opponents of Sharia law outlawed its application in family law-based
arbitration following a lengthy campaign.2 In addition to these develop-
ments—which bore directly on Islamic law—came a rising tide of Euro-
pean laws aimed at Muslim clothing, especially the headscarf and burqa.3
To address the growing assertion that Islam is somehow incompatible
with liberal democratic norms, the symposium directed its attention to the
challenges, opportunities, and tensions that might exist between Islamic law
* Associate Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law.
1. See generally Doctor Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, Archbishop’s Lecture
- Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious Perspective (Feb. 7, 2008) (transcript available
at http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1575#). For criticism of the Archbishop’s position, see
Williams Under Fire in Sharia Row, BBC NEWS (Feb. 8, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
uk_news/politics/7233335.stm (recording reaction of a spokesperson for the then Prime Minister
Gordon Brown that “British laws should be based on British values.”). See also John Witte, Jr. &
Joel A. Nichols, The Frontiers of Marital Pluralism: An Afterword, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN
A MULTI-CULTURAL CONTEXT: MULTI-TIERED MARRIAGE AND THE BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL LAW
AND RELIGION (Joel A. Nichols ed., forthcoming 2011).
2. For an overview, see Faisal Kutty, The Myth and Reality of “Shari’a Courts” in Canada:
A Delayed Opportunity for the Indigenization of Islamic Legal Rulings, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 559,
562–76 (2010) (describing background and development of the controversy).
3. The French have recently passed a law banning the wearing of the burqa in public places.
See French Burqa Ban Clears Last Legal Obstacle, CNN (Oct. 7, 2010), http://edition.cnn.com/
2010/WORLD/europe/10/07/france.burqa.ban/index.html?iref=allsearch. Similar laws either have
passed or are under consideration in Belgium, Quebec, and Switzerland. For a brief overview, see
Robert A. Kahn, Are Muslims the New Catholics? Europe’s Headscarf Laws in Comparative
Historical Perspective, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. (forthcoming 2011).
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and liberal democracy.4 Now, as Noah Feldman points out, one can justly
argue that there ought to be no “tension” at all, and that private law relig-
ious claims—whether Muslim, Jewish, or Catholic—can in no way threaten
liberty, precisely because they are private.5 He is also right to warn that
using the word “tension” carries the risk of unintentionally fanning the
flames of growing anti-Muslim sentiment on both sides of the Atlantic.6
That said, there is merit to understanding the causes of the recent up-
surge of anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim rhetoric in countries with Muslim
minorities. A good deal of this rhetoric turns on asserted “tensions” be-
tween Islamic law and liberal democracy.7 Indeed, as Feldman points out,
during the 19th century many Americans questioned the compatibility of
Catholicism and American democracy.8 Examining similar doubts about Is-
lam is the first step toward winning over those opponents whose minds can
be changed.9 At a minimum, such an examination will let Muslims and their
supporters know what they are up against.10
Second, the use of the word “tension” reflects the historical reality
that, in the United States, broad declarations in favor of religious toleration
4. The organizing materials for the symposium posed two questions. First, what were the
“challenges and opportunities” facing Muslim-majority nations seeking to integrate Islamic law
and constitutional rights? Second, what were the “tensions” that might exist between adherence to
Islamic law and the norms of liberal democracies in nations with growing Muslim minorities?
University of St. Thomas Law Journal, Organizing Materials, Apr. 12, 2010.
5. Noah Feldman, Islamic Constitutionalism in Context: A Typology and a Warning, 7 U.
ST. THOMAS L.J. 436, 440–41 (2010).
6. Id. at 440. As examples of the recent surge in anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim “paranoia” in
the United States, Feldman mentions the uproar over the construction of an Islamic community
center in lower Manhattan, and the amendment passed by Oklahoma voters in the 2010 midterm
elections to ban the Sharia. Id. at 436–40.
7. John Feffer, writing in Mother Jones, speaks of a new “Islamo-fascism” school of
thought, which holds that “the fundamentalists are simply the new ‘totalitarians,’ as hidebound,
fanatical, and incapable of change as the communists.” John Feffer, The Lies of Islamophobia,
MOTHER JONES (Nov. 8, 2010), http://motherjones.com/politics/2010/11/american-islamophobia?
page=1.
8. Feldman, supra note 5, at 439. While Feldman points out that doubts about Catholics
today are absurd, id. at 449, this modern view emerged slowly. As late as 1960, there was a
concern that “although Catholics were legally allowed toleration of the practices of their faith,
there was . . . a cultural conflict or ill-fit between Catholics and ‘the dominant Protestant tradi-
tions’ over the religious contents welcome within the ‘traditional Anglo-American culture.’”
Thomas W. Jodziewicz, In the Matter of Catholic Historiography: A Proposal, 14 CATH. SOC.
SCI. REV. 271, 285 (2009) (quoting Thomas T. McAvoy, American Catholics: Tradition and Con-
troversy, 35 THOUGHT 583, 588 (1960)). One could make the same point about Islam—formal
equality is relatively easy to obtain, genuine acceptance more difficult.
9. This may be why Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf lists reducing “Western nations’ fear of ‘Is-
lamic States’” as one of the motivations behind his project to establish a Sharia-Compliancy
Index. Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, Justification & Theory of Sharia Law: How the American Decla-
ration of Independence, Bill of Rights and Constitution Are Consistent with Islamic Jurispru-
dence, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 452, 456 (2010).
10. Furthermore, as a community dedicated to “integrating faith and reason in the search for
truth,” the University of St. Thomas School of Law seeks to discuss controversial issues with
persons of opposing viewpoints.
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alternated with acts of religious bigotry. During the controversy over the
Florida pastor who wanted to burn the Qur’an, Secretary of State Hilary
Clinton referred to a speech from 1790 at Newport, Rhode Island, in which
George Washington stated that the United States would give “bigotry no
sanction” and “persecution no assistance.”11 Yet five years earlier, officials
from New York City insisted that a Catholic church be built outside the city
limits and the church, St. Peter’s Roman Catholic Church, was subject to
anti-Catholic demonstrations in 1806.12 Clearly, even in the United States,
full-fledged religious toleration has always been a work in progress.
A final reason to speak of “tensions” comes from the papers presented
at the conference. Each presenter, in his or her own way, questioned the
claim that Islamic and liberal democratic values are incompatible. The re-
sult is an incredibly rich discussion of Islamic law, liberal values, courts,
democracy, and constitution-making among other topics. The summary of
this discussion that follows can, by necessity, only scratch the surface.
II. ISLAMIC LAW IN MUSLIM-MINORITY COUNTRIES
The first group of symposium contributors focused on the role of Is-
lamic law in countries where Muslims are a minority. In a set of moving
remarks, U.S. Representative Keith Ellison, the first Muslim elected to the
U.S. Congress, noted that conflicts that appear to pit Muslims as opponents
of liberal values—as, for example, when Muslim cabdrivers in the Twin
Cities refused to transport passengers carrying alcohol—sometimes have
more prosaic roots.13 (According to Ellison, the cab drivers were more con-
cerned about the conditions of their employment, including having bath-
room breaks.)14 For Ellison, the watchword is flexibility—on the one hand,
“religious accommodation is part of the American constitutional frame-
work”; on the other, “Islamic law is nowhere near as rigid as some people
might represent it to be.”15
Meanwhile, John Bowen highlighted some of the practical difficulties
that emerge in implementing Islamic law in a Muslim-minority country.16
In a masterful discussion of Islamic divorce law as applied by the Islamic
Sharia Council in London and by an English court in a recent case, he
moved the discussion from whether Britain should “recognize” Sharia law
11. Paul Owen et al., Qur’an Burning Day to Go Ahead Despite Death Threats, GUARDIAN,
Sept. 8, 2010 (quoting Letter of George Washington to the Jews of Newport (1790)).
12. Paul Vitello, In Fierce Opposition to a Muslim Center, Echoes of an Old Fight, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2010, at A19.
13. U.S. Representative Keith Ellison, Opening Address at the University of St. Thomas Law
Journal Symposium: Islamic Law and Constitutional Liberty (Apr. 12, 2010), in 7 U. ST. THOMAS
L.J. 403, 409 (2010).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. John R. Bowen, How Could English Courts Recognize Shariah?, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J.
411 (2010).
ix
to how, as a practical matter, the courts and councils should apply Sharia
law.17 Based on his research, Bowen concludes that seeking “a universal set
of rules that constitute ‘[S]haria law’” will likely fail.18 According to
Bowen, the better approach “is to draw from English legal resources and
common sense the categories and imperatives that respond to the legal mat-
ter at hand.”19
Sometimes practical approaches can resolve what appears to be a polit-
ical impasse. In a perceptive analysis of the campaign against Muslims’ use
of Sharia law in proceedings brought under the Ontario arbitration laws,20
law professor and Canadian attorney Faisal Kutty spoke of a lost opportu-
nity to advance the evolution of Islamic law in Canada by “indigenizing
Islamic legal rulings.”21 This would involve the community (ummah) taking
part in an “internal struggle with its customs, practices, and principles.”22
As an example of what is possible with a bottom-up, context-sensitive ap-
proach to Islamic law, Kutty mentions the Fiqh Council of North America,
which adopts legal rulings that are “culturally, politically, and socially rele-
vant to the North American or Western contexts.”23
III. GENERAL APPROACHES TO THE COMPATIBILITY OF ISLAMIC LAW
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES
Two of the contributors raised the compatibility question at a more
general level. In a work with groundbreaking potential, Imam Feisal Abdul
Rauf proposes creating an index that would measure the extent to which a
given country complies with the Sharia.24 The index would serve several
goals, including moving “away from a demographic—or institution—based
definition of an Islamic state,” to one that focuses on outcomes, clarifying
for Muslims the relationship between religion and political power and, as
noted above, reducing the fear of Islamic states in the West.25
The project, while still in its initial phase, may yield surprising results.
One is the weakening of the traditional boundary between majority-Muslim
countries (Dar al-Islam) and countries in which Muslims make up a minor-
ity (Dar al-Harb).26 Here Abdul Rauf notes the large number of Muslims in
17. Id. at 411, 413, 435.
18. Id. at 435.
19. Id.
20. Kutty, supra note 2.
21. Id. at 560.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 595.
24. Abdul Rauf, supra note 9. While Abdul Rauf submitted a paper, he was unfortunately
unable to attend the conference itself.
25. Id. at 454.
26. Id. at 468.
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Western Europe and North America,27 as well as the intellectual freedom
afforded by most Western countries.28
Abdul Rauf points to a special compatibility between the United States
and Islam. Part of this relates to the historical circumstance that, during the
Enlightenment, “America did not go as far as Europe in eliminating religion
and religious thought from its societal worldview.”29 Another reason relates
to the nature of the Declaration of Independence, which, in the tradition of
Muslim rights discourse, bases rights on a series of historical wrongs—in
the case of the Declaration, wrongs committed by the British government.30
This reason ties in with what Abdul Rauf calls a “verb-based” conception of
human rights, which rests on a series of duties—literally “a list of do’s and
don’ts”—standing in contrast to most “noun-based” Western conceptions,
which view rights as “entitlements.”31
Liaquat Ali Khan addressed the question of the distinctiveness of Is-
lamic law from a slightly different angle.32 In a detailed, thought-provoking
article, Khan divides law into two categories—fana¯ (transient) and baqa¯
(eternal).33 Fana¯ consists of positive law—including jurisprudence (fiqh),
custom (urf), legislation and regulations (qanun), and international law
(siyar)—and is by its very nature “open to modifications and deletions.”34
Baqa¯—what Khan calls the “Basic Code”—is God’s law. It includes the
Qur’an and the Sunnah, and cannot be altered.35 Moreover, because Baqa¯ is
divine law, it is not subject to text-skepticism, i.e., where judges “extract
diametrically opposing rules from the same words.”36
A key element for Khan is the “submission principle,” under which the
fana¯ “must all submit to God’s law as revealed in the Basic Code.”37 This
leads Khan to distinguish between supremacy clauses, like the one in the
U.S. Constitution,38 that “uphold[ ] the supernormativity of a human consti-
tution,” and compatibility clauses, like the one in Pakistan’s Constitution
(mandating that “existing laws . . . be brought in conformity with the In-
27. Id. at 469.
28. Id. at 469–71 (“Rethinking Islam depends upon the freedom to think[,] . . . and thus, for
now at least, must be done in the West.”) (citing MOHAMMED ARKOUN, RETHINKING ISLAM: COM-
MON QUESTIONS, UNCOMMON ANSWERS ix (Robert D. Lee ed., trans., 1994)).
29. Id. at 473 n.53.
30. Abdul Rauf identifies two dozen specific wrongs the Declaration of Independence attrib-
utes to the British. Id. at 496, 497.
31. Id. at 487.
32. See L. Ali Khan, Fana¯ and Baqa¯ Infinities of Islam: Approaches to Islamic Law and
Behavior, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 511 (2010).
33. Id. at 512.
34. Id. at 514.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 531.
37. Id. at 541.
38. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
xi
junctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur’an and Sunnah”)39 that
submit themselves “to the supernormativity of the Basic Code.”40
As a consequence of this difference, the U.S. Constitution is subject to
“text-skepticism” in a way an Islamic Constitution grounded in the Basic
Code should not be.41 Moreover, the basis of obedience to an Islamic Con-
stitution differs from a secular constitution in that the former is legitimated
by fears of eternal punishment.42 Accordingly, the Qur’an repudiated the
attitude that it is okay to sin so long as one does not get caught, because
“God is ‘aware of all that you do.’”43
IV. ISLAMIC LAW IN MUSLIM-MAJORITY COUNTRIES
The final group of participants focused on how the tension between
Islamic law and constitutional liberty is managed in majority-Muslim states.
In his keynote address, Noah Feldman provided a useful framework for
looking at how Islamism44 plays out in majority-Muslim states. First, one
can view Islamism at the level of politics.45 Here Feldman notes the ability
of Islamist political parties to garner votes—at least as long as they are shut
out of political power.46
The second way Islamism can influence a majority-Muslim state con-
cerns philosophy.47 Just as in the West, the Muslim world frames issues of
constitutional philosophy as a series of never-ending debates.48 The main
issues of the debate over Islamism concern statements that the Sharia is the
source of law, clauses that invalidate laws that violate Islamic law (repug-
nancy clauses), and the use of Islamic norms in family law.49
The final category Feldman proposes is the legal-institutional plane,
which includes positive law and the institutions that administer it.50 The
challenges of an individual lawsuit arise in this plane. Here, in a manner
similar to Bowen’s description of Islamic divorce law in England, the indi-
vidual lawyer must navigate a sea of institutional details to do the best for
the client.51
39. PAKISTAN CONST. art. 227(1).
40. Ali Khan, supra note 32, at 543.
41. Id. at 532.
42. Id. at 552.
43. Id. at 555 (quoting Qur’an 6:3).
44. Feldman defines Islamism as a movement incorporating the slogan “Islam is the answer.”
Feldman, supra note 5, at 441–42.
45. Id. at 441.
46. By contrast, once Islamist parties come into office, they tend to lose votes—either be-
cause they no longer gain protest votes or because, once in office, they are subject to the same
temptations to corruption as any other party. Id. at 442, 448.
47. Id. at 443.
48. Id. at 446.
49. Id. at 444–45.
50. Id. at 446.
51. Id. at 447.
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These three categories are interrelated.52 Looking toward the future,
Feldman rejects the claim that Islam and democracy are incompatible, and
suggests that Islamism might succeed in creating new institutions to bring
about Sharia-based constitutional governance.53 While such institutions
could just as easily collapse,54 the most likely outcome is a “muddling
through,”55 in which new Islamic institutions hover on the “periphery” of
society.56 Whether such “muddling through” is positive turns on whether
the legal-institutional plane functions smoothly enough for citizens to be-
lieve the state reflects their values.57
The remaining panelists look at the prospects for Islamic law in spe-
cific majority-Muslim countries. In a thoughtful description of the imple-
mentation of Islamic law in the Aceh province of Indonesia, Asma Uddin
raises the broad question of “whether Sharia can ever be translated into
positive law without implicating religious freedom.”58
Her article describes laws in Indonesia as a whole, and Aceh in partic-
ular, that restrict basic human rights.59 Uddin attributes the state of affairs
in Aceh in part to a change in its political structure—in earlier times, sup-
port for Sharia law came from the priestly class, which used it largely to
check the power of the Sultan.60 More recently, however, “Sharia imple-
mentation gives the ruler both religious and political authority, thus remov-
ing checks on power and inevitably leading to the type of authoritarianism
evident in many parts of the Muslim world.”61 Uddin concludes that the
Sharia implementation in Aceh has failed to promote public order or in-
crease religiosity.62 If this is true, then Aceh may be a place where the
Islamist movement should fail because, in Feldman’s terms, it failed to “de-
liver distinctive, effective institutions that actually improve people’s
lives.”63
52. See id. at 449 (“Philosophical ideas are promoted by actual human beings who are then
connected to actual institutions.”).
53. Id. at 449–50.
54. Id. at 450.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 451.
58. Asma Uddin, Religious Freedom Implications of Sharia Implementation in Aceh, Indone-
sia, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 603, 604 (2010).
59. Id. at 611–14 (describing Indonesia’s wide bans on blasphemy and proselytizing), 633
(describing provincial bans on intoxication, gambling, being alone with a non-relative of the oppo-
site gender, fornication, homosexuality, adultery, and false accusations of adultery).
60. Id. at 643 (citing NOAH FELDMAN, THE FALL AND RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 29, 33
(2008)).
61. Id. at 644.
62. Id. at 647–48.
63. Feldman, supra note 5, at 450. Part of the problem is also that the Aceh Sharia code led
to the politicization of Islam by favoring one interpretation above all others. Uddin, supra note 58,
at 2. So, for Uddin, the difficulty with Aceh comes from a particular institutionalization of Islamic
law, rather than from Islamic law itself (or from Muslims). This distinction is often lost on nativist
American anti-Muslim bigots, such as Rex Duncan, an Oklahoma legislator and one of the main
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On the other hand, Clark Lombardi, in an exhaustive study of Pakistani
Judge A. R. Cornelius, raises the intriguing possibility that Islamization, in
some circumstances at least, “can actually help strengthen the thickly lib-
eral rule of law.”64 Born into an Indian family of Christian academics, Cor-
nelius converted to Catholicism, and, taking Pakistani citizenship, served on
the Pakistani Supreme Court during the 1950s and 1960s.65 He was per-
plexed at the reluctance of the Pakistani elite to latch on to arguments
against state power based on the British common law.66 Over time, he came
to two realizations: (1) Pakistanis, post-Independence, were not necessarily
attached to the common law; and (2) in Britain itself, the legitimacy of the
common law depended on the extent to which it was seen to have a divine
pedigree.67 Meanwhile, developments in the Arab world (most notably the
revised Egyptian Civil Code drafted according to modernist Islamic princi-
ples),68 suggested the possibility of a liberal Islamic code, which judges
could interpret even if they lacked classical Islamic training.69
Applying his new found insights to Pakistan of the mid-1960s, Corne-
lius called for lawyers to lend their prestige to an Islamization process that
would still allow a role for lawyers as interpreters of the law.70 This, be-
lieved Cornelius, was the only way “a stable legal order could emerge.”71
As Lombardi points out, Cornelius could take harsh positions—such as
questioning the feasibility of banning honor killings,72 or comparing ampu-
tation and other traditional Islamic punishments to their British counter-
parts.73 Islamization for Cornelius, however, was the only way to re-
establish “a judicially supervised, liberal democracy” in Pakistan and, as
such, was worth the risk of what Lombardi calls “non-trivial concessions to
illiberal popular beliefs about God’s command.”74
Turning his attention to more recent Pakistani history, Lombardi ar-
gues convincingly that even though Islamization is often seen as a top-down
process put into place by General Zia-al-Haq in the 1970s, the judiciary
authors of the Oklahoma Sharia ban, who warned that Muslims were threatening the “liberties and
freedom [of] our children.” James C. McKinley Jr., Oklahoma Surprise: Islam as an Election
Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2010, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/15/us/15
oklahoma.html?pagewanted=all.
64. Clark Lombardi, Can Islamizing a Legal System Ever Help Promote Liberal Democ-
racy?: A View from Pakistan, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 649, 650 (2010).
65. Id. at 651–52, 655, 689.
66. See id. at 667.
67. Id. at 665–67. This is quite similar to Ali Khan’s notion of a “compatibility clause” under
which all positive law must conform to the Basic Code of divine law. See Ali Khan, supra note
32, at 543. Interestingly, Khan uses Pakistan as his example of such a clause. Id.
68. Lombardi, supra note 64, at 29–36.
69. Id. at 672–73.
70. Id. at 674.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 676.
73. Id. at 679.
74. Id. at 680.
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played a major role in Islamizing Pakistan’s laws, doing so in a way that
challenged Zia-al-Haq himself.75 Based on his study, Lombardi suggests
that countries like the United States, rather than supporting “liberal secular-
ism,” should instead encourage lawyers in majority-Muslim countries to
promote a liberal interpretation of Islam.76
As we have seen, one of the methods to ensure the Islamic nature of a
state is through “repugnancy clauses.”77 Haider Ala Hamoudi asks why
Iraq’s repugnancy clause (Article 2 of its Constitution), itself the subject of
considerable debate during the passage of the Iraqi constitution, has yet to
be used.78 After dismissing a number of conventional explanations—such
as a general lack of constitutional activity in Iraq—he concludes that the
Shi’i Najaf-based religious hierarchy has determined that it does not need
the repugnancy clause to enforce religious norms in the region it dominates,
and that any attempt to use the clause will lead to a backlash by Sunnis and
secular Iraqis.79
Indeed, Iraq’s repugnancy clause is better understood as an assertion of
Islamic identity. To show this, Hamoudi gives the example of the Iraqi
Kurds who, while much more secular than the rest of Iraq, adopted a similar
provision in their constitution.80 The provision was meant to deflect Iraqi-
Arab criticism of other parts of the constitution by showing that the Kurds
shared Iraq’s Muslim identity.81
The Kurdish example shows how Feldman’s plane of constitutional
philosophy can, at times, be quite divorced from his legal institutional
plane.82 It also shows that sometimes a majority-Muslim state can adopt an
“Islamic” constitutional provision for largely symbolic reasons. Finally,
Hamoudi’s larger analysis of Iraq carries a lesson for students of constitu-
tion making, who must always distinguish between the constitution in the
book and the constitution in action.83
The final contributor, Russell Powell, raises the question of whether
Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) can translate its “Islamist”
rhetoric into something compatible with Turkey’s long-standing tradition of
75. Id. at 688 (citing MARTIN LAU, THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF PAKISTAN
1 (2006)).
76. Id. at 691.
77. Ali Khan, supra note 32, at 542–43 (describing Pakistan’s repugnancy clause); Feldman,
supra note 5, at 445; Haider Ala Hamoudi, Ornamental Repugnancy: Identitarian Islam and the
Iraqi Constitution, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 692, 692 (2010).
78. Hamoudi, supra note 77, at 692–93.
79. Id. at 702–05 (describing reasons for juristic restraint).
80. Id. at 711–12.
81. Id.
82. See Feldman, supra note 5, at 443.
83. In a wonderful analogy, Hamoudi compares scholarship on Iraq’s repugnancy clause to a
hypothetical observer to the United States who debated—even after the legal issue was made clear
in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)—whether the Constitution granted Congress the
power to authorize a national bank. Hamoudi, supra note 77, at 695.
xv
Kemalist secularism.84 Powell largely answers this question in the affirma-
tive with the help of analyses by leading observers of the Turkish scene.85
These observers divide into two groups. The modernists argue that the
AKP, by focusing on issues of religious freedom and group rights, have led
to a more vibrant political culture in Turkey.86 The post-modernists ques-
tion whether Kemalist secularism is, in fact, the most authentic expression
of Turkish identity.87
Particularly noteworthy is the idea that parties like the AKP challenge
Turkey’s secularist elite without directly calling for a religious state.88 This
allows the AKP to present itself as a representative of conservative, yet
democratic values.89 Equally significant is the Islamist parties’ success in
gaining support of  “wealthier mercantile families” through their opposition
to corruption90—precisely what Feldman would suggest might happen in a
non-competitive political environment.91 But in Turkey, presumably, the Is-
lamic parties have made headway under conditions of relative political free-
dom. Finally, Powell raises the intriguing possibility that Turkey may be
transitioning from an era of aggressive secularism, marked by “government
control and the erasure of religion from public life” to passive secularism,
characterized by “free exercise and anti-establishment principles.”92
V. CONCLUSION
Taken together, the ten essays in this volume pay tribute both to the
diversity of Islam and the diverse ways scholars have theorized the relation-
ship between Muslims, Islam, Islamic Law, liberal values, constitutional-
ism, and democracy. The authors differ in the approaches they take, the
countries they study, and the conclusions they reach. Yet they share a com-
mon commitment, as stated by Noah Feldman, to take as their starting point
the understanding that Islamic law and constitutional liberty are compati-
ble.93 As such, this volume sends a message to those in American public
life who have, in recent months, called this starting point into question.
84. Russell Powell, The Study of Secularism and Religion in the Constitution and Contempo-
rary Politics of Turkey: The Rise of Interdisciplinarity and the Decline of Methodology?, 7 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 714, 714 (2010).
85. Id. at 725.
86. Id. at 726.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 723.
89. Id. at 714.
90. Id. at 722–23.
91. Feldman, supra note 5, at 441, 448.
92. Powell, supra note 84, at 724.
93. Feldman, supra note 5, at 451.
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